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Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency1 (EPA) is a 
rare, potentially monumental case in the areas of standing, 
climate change regulation, and the degree of deference accorded 
in judicial review of agency action.  For environmental litigation 
in particular, the case may prove transformative.  Despite the 
considerable scholarly attention given to the case in the months 
since it was decided, three potentially crucial points have 
received relatively little attention: (1) the integration of an 
environmentalist worldview into standing analysis (by permitting 
a challenge to one input in an interconnected global system); (2) 
near embrace of scientific consensus on climate change that runs 
contrary to professed agency uncertainty; and (3) recognition of 
EPA’s significant, but incomplete role in resolving a global 
environmental problem.  On each point, Massachusetts supports 
a globalist view of environmental law by integrating global 
environmental concerns into cognizable challenges to domestic 
agency regulation. 
Of its three holdings–that petitioners have standing, the 
Clean Air Act authorizes regulation of greenhouse gases, and 
EPA’s reasons for declining to regulate were insufficient–
standing receives the most careful attention in the Supreme 
Court’s opinion.2  That discussion wrestles with the feature of 
climate change that distinguishes it from most, if not all, 
environmental contexts in which the Court has ruled.  Climate 
change is a global phenomenon.  The very recognition of climate 
 
1 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
2 See id. at 1463. 
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change as creating cognizable harms requires an acceptance of 
the interconnectedness of a global environmental system. 
To review the issue presented–whether the EPA erroneously 
declined to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor 
vehicles–the Court had to address a narrow and rigid standing 
doctrine that would seem to preclude review of a phenomenon 
that might be fairly characterized as “harmful to humanity at 
large.”3  By identifying concrete and particularized injuries 
traceable to climate change and potentially redressible by courts, 
the Court embraced a perspective on each element of standing 
that is fundamentally different from the narrow analysis that the 
Court demanded only fifteen years earlier.  Recognizing a 
cognizable claim in Massachusetts required acceptance that 
courts may review challenges to one input into the climate 
system–emissions from new motor vehicles in the United 
States–even if the input is not itself determinative of the 
complete impact on the plaintiffs.  Nonetheless, the opinion 
creates a  question of how broadly the newly endorsed analysis 
will apply. 
Similarly, the Court required a baseline against which to 
assess the claims, both for justiciability and on the merits.  The 
global consensus on climate change science–its mechanisms and 
likely effects–provided that baseline.  Rarely, if ever, has the 
Court so strongly endorsed a scientific position contrary to that 
professed by an expert agency.  Whether this approach may be 
exported to other environmental issues remains to be seen, but 
the opinion provides a strong basis for arguing that widely 
recognized scientific interconnections within complex systems 
can support arguments against agency inaction premised on 
purported lack of knowledge about impacts. 
Most broadly, Massachusetts v. EPA represents the first time 
that a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the 
relationship between U.S. environmental regulation and global 
environmental problems.  In this sense, the decision is deeply 
globalist–it accepts jurisdiction based on the interconnection 
between U.S. environmental regulation and a global 
environmental system that is fed by many sources.  This globalist 
 
3 Id. at 1452 (quoting Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 415 F.3d 50, 60 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005) (Sentelle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
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view could become a stepping stone toward a new paradigm of 
judicial review in environmental matters of global concern. 
This Article begins, in Part I, with an overview of the 
emergence of scientific and legal consensus (or near consensus) 
on the core mechanism underlying climate change and the need 
for regulatory action.  Next, Part II provides historical 
background on the Supreme Court’s development and 
application of standing doctrine, illustrating the unique difficulty 
of reconciling environmental cases with narrow conceptions of 
jurisdiction.  In Part III, this Article discusses the majority 
opinion in Massachusetts and the dissent by Chief Justice 
Roberts on standing grounds.  Part IV demonstrates the 
significance of Massachusetts’ embrace of a standing theory 
based on interconnection in environmental systems, arguing that 
the analysis should apply equally to public and private plaintiffs 
in environmental cases.  Further, Part V demonstrates the role 
of scientific consensus in driving the standing analysis and 
highlights the impact of this acceptance on lower court cases and 
the potential impact in other areas of environmental regulation.  
This part concludes by explaining the Court’s broader 
recognition of U.S. regulation in a global context as a step 
toward a greater incorporation of global concerns in U.S. 
environmental litigation.4 
I 
CLIMATE CHANGE: SCIENTIFIC CONSENSUS, INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL CONSENSUS, AND THE UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE 
Undoubtedly, “[c]limate change is a global environmental 
problem.  Its causes, effects, and potential solutions transcend 
state boundaries, creating a need for international cooperation.”5  
At the same time, climate change involves national and 
subnational causes, effects, and regulation.6  Widespread 
scientific consensus exists that the anthropogenic release of 
 
4 I will more thoroughly address incorporation of international concerns and 
consensus into future U.S. climate change litigation in a separate article. 
5 Michele M. Betsill, Global Climate Change Policy: Making Progress or 
Spinning Wheels?, in THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT:  INSTITUTIONS, LAW, AND 
POLICY 103, 103 (Regina S. Axelrod et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
6 E.g., Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation: 
Implications for Transnational Regulatory Governance, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1789 
(2005). 
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“greenhouse gases,”–including carbon dioxide, methane, and 
nitrous oxide, among others–accumulate in the earth’s 
atmosphere, adding to the natural atmospheric presence of these 
heat-trapping gases and leading to an overall warming of the 
planet.7 
The effects of rising mean global temperatures will vary by 
region and are not fully understood.  However, in recent years, 
observation of events and scientific modeling have begun to 
suggest that linear effects (such as relatively gradual and 
constant rises in sea levels due to melting of glaciers and ice 
sheets) do not capture the full threat posed by anthropogenic 
climate change.  Non-linear scenarios in which tipping points 
cause rapid climate change events present significantly less 
predictable dangers.8 
Congress first formally recognized the possibility of climate 
change in 1978, in the National Climate Program Act, which 
directed further executive action to study the problem.9  In 1987, 
Congress passed the Global Climate Protection Act, which 
directed the EPA to formulate a national policy to address 
climate change issues and urged diplomatic measures toward a 
multilateral climate agreement.10 
Scientific and legal consensus concerning climate change has 
grown steadily since the 1980s.11  Most significantly, the United 
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
issued a series of reports that reflect the scientific community’s 
growing confidence in the mechanisms and risks associated with 
 
7 See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS (2007), 
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf 
[hereinafter IPCC REPORT]; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE 
SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY QUESTIONS (2001). 
8 IPCC REPORT, supra note 7, at 13–14. 
9 National Climate Program Act, Pub. L. No. 95-367, 92 Stat. 601 (1978) (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2908 (2006)). 
10 Global Climate Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 100-204, tit. xi, 101 Stat. 1331, 1407 
(1987). 
11 Naomi Oreskes, The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 SCIENCE 
1686, 1686 (2004) (finding that, of the 928 peer-reviewed papers addressing “global 
climate change” published in the decade before 2003, none argued against the 
consensus position that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are causing 
climate change). 
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anthropogenic climate change.12  Most recently, IPCC’s Fourth 
Assessment Report concluded, among other things, that 
“[w]arming of the climate system is unequivocal” and “[m]ost of 
the observed increase in globally-averaged temperatures since 
the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase 
in anthropogenic [greenhouse gas] concentrations.”13 
Shortly after IPCC’s First Assessment Report in 1990, the 
United States and other nations worked toward creating a 
comprehensive global response to climate change through a 
multilateral treaty regime.  In 1992, 154 nations, including the 
United States, entered “the first international environmental 
agreement to be negotiated by virtually the whole of the 
international community,” the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC).14  The UNFCCC, which was 
ratified by the United States Congress15 but does not contain 
binding commitments to reduce emissions, explicitly seeks 
“stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere.”16  The UNFCCC requires parties to adopt 
measures and policies toward this end.17  These measures and 
policies “will demonstrate that developed countries are taking 
the lead in modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic 
emissions” of greenhouse gases.18  The UNFCCC laid the 
groundwork for further monitoring, domestic action, and 
negotiation toward a binding international climate change 
regime. 
 
12 See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: IPCC Reports, 
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/index.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). 
13 IPCC REPORT, supra note 7, at 1, 5. 
14 Philipe Sands, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 359 
(2d ed. 2003); Donald A. Brown, The U.S. Performance in Achieving Its 1992 Earth 
Summit Global Warming Commitments, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,741 (2002). 
15 Brown, supra note 14, at 10,742 (The UNFCCC’s provisions have been 
“agreed to by Congress and are now part of a binding treaty.  They therefore 
constitute fully vetted U.S. promises about how it will approach global warming       
. . . .  These UNFCCC commitments are therefore the only international obligations 
accepted by the United States that specifically define a national approach to global 
warming.”). 
16 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 4, May 9, 
1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, available at http://unfccc.int/ 
resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
17 Id. art. 4(2). 
18 Id. art. 4(2)(a). 
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Following IPCC’s next comprehensive report in 1995, 
UNFCCC parties negotiated the Kyoto Protocol, which 
contained the first binding limitations on emissions of 
greenhouse gases.19  Negotiation of UNFCCC’s 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol involved over 150 states.20  Despite signing the Kyoto 
Protocol and prominently supporting it during negotiations, the 
United States ultimately withdrew from the Protocol in 2001–
the same year that the Natural Resources Council issued a 
report agreeing with IPCC’s conclusions.21  The Kyoto Protocol 
contains a level of detail and complexity that is unprecedented in 
international regulation of environmental issues.22  The climate 
change regime represents the cutting edge of international 
environmental law, both in terms of overwhelming consensus on 
policy goals and the sophistication of international mechanisms 
agreed to by most states. 
Since its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, U.S. climate 
change policy has relied upon voluntary measures.  Those 
measures include supposed incentives for domestic private 
sector emissions reductions and bilateral negotiations to 
encourage emissions reductions in other nations.23  Currently, 
the international community is negotiating toward a post–Kyoto 
agreement.24  Whether the United States will ultimately agree to 
binding international commitments is not clear. 
One of the most direct avenues for challenging the existing 
lack of a binding response to climate change at the federal level 
is to claim that greenhouse gases should be regulated as 
pollutants under the Clean Air Act (CAA).25  In 1998, EPA 
 
19 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). 
20 Philippe Sands & Jacqueline Peel, Environmental Protection in the Twenty-first 
Century: Sustainable Development and International Law, in THE GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENT 43, 44 (Regina S. Axelrod et. al eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
21 Douglas Jehl, U.S. Going Empty-Handed to Meeting on Global Warming, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2001, at A22; see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7. 
22 Sands & Peel, supra note 20, at 48. 
23 Several significant subnational efforts have emerged to fill the void.  See, e.g., 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: An Initiative of the Northeast and Mid-
Atlantic States of the U.S., http://www.rggi.org/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2008). 
24 See, e.g., Bali Roadmap, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL. (Int’l Inst. for 
Sustainable Dev.), Dec. 18, 2007, at 15, available at http://www.iisd.ca/download/ 
pdf/enb12354e.pdf. 
25 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006). 
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General Counsel Jonathan Cannon issued a memorandum 
opining that carbon dioxide met the legal definition of a 
pollutant under the CAA.26  In 1999, approximately twenty 
environmental organizations and renewable energy proponents 
filed a petition with the EPA seeking regulation of carbon 
dioxide as a pollutant under the CAA.27  A similar number of 
industry organizations opposed the petition.  Also in 1999, EPA 
General Counsel Gary Guzy concluded that the CAA 
authorized the EPA to regulate carbon dioxide.28 
In August 2003, the EPA denied the petition for rulemaking 
and determined it did not have authority to regulate carbon 
dioxide under the CAA.29  EPA General Counsel Robert 
Fabricant simultaneously withdrew the Cannon memorandum 
and concluded that the CAA does not authorize the EPA to 
regulate carbon dioxide.30 
In October 2003, a coalition of states, cities, and 
environmental groups commenced Massachusetts v. EPA to 
challenge EPA’s denial of the petition.  Ten states and 
numerous industry organizations joined the suit as intervenors in 
support of EPA’s decision not to regulate carbon dioxide.31  
Among the biggest hurdles to the success of this action-forcing 
litigation on climate change was the doctrine of standing.32  As 
 
26 Memorandum from Jonathan Z. Cannon, Gen. Counsel, Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
to Carol M. Browner, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency (Apr. 10, 1998), available at 
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/cannon-memorandum.pdf. 
27 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1446 (2007). 
28 Is CO2 a Pollutant and Does EPA Have the Power to Regulate It?: Joint 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, 
and Regulatory Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Reform and Subcomm. 
on Energy and the Environment of the House Comm. on Science, 106th Cong. 3–4 
(1999) (statement of Gary S. Guzy). 
29 Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 
52,922, 52,925 (Sept. 8, 2003). 
30 Memorandum from Robert E. Fabricant, Gen. Counsel, Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
to Marianne L. Horinko, Acting Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency (Aug. 28, 2003), 
available at http://www.icta.org/doc/FabricantMemoAug282003.pdf. 
31 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1446. 
32 Cases addressing standing prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Massachusetts came out both ways.  See, e.g., Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Owens Corning 
Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 957, 971 (D. Or. 2006) (finding plaintiffs had standing to 
bring suit); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (dismissing action because plaintiffs did not have standing).  For a pre-
Massachusetts discussion of standing in climate change cases, see Bradford C.  
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discussed below, the evolution of the standing doctrine has 
unnecessarily restricted federal courts from hearing issues on the 
cutting edge of environmental concern. 
II 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF STANDING DOCTRINE AND ITS INITIAL 
APPLICATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL CASES 
A.  Origins and Early Understanding of Standing 
Massachusetts is a case concerned with the core limitations of 
federal court jurisdiction as created by Article III of the 
Constitution.  Article III, Section 2 provides that “[t]he judicial 
power shall extend to . . . Cases . . . [and] Controversies.”33  Prior 
to the twentieth century, parties were understood to be able to 
access federal courts if a law provided for such access (a cause of 
action).34  Indeed, “for the first 150 years of the Republic–the 
Framers, the first Congresses, and the Court were oblivious to 
the modern conception either that standing is a component of 
the constitutional phrase ‘cases or controversies’ or that it is a 
prerequisite for seeking governmental compliance with the 
law.”35  Indeed, far from articulating rigid standing requirements 
and “contrary to modern fastidiousness about saddling courts 
with ‘nonjudicial’ business, Congress in the early years of the 
Republic seemed to have little hesitation in using courts or 
judicial personnel as administrators.”36 
 
Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 
1 (2005). 
33 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
34 Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?  Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” 
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 177 (1992).  “There is absolutely no 
affirmative evidence that Article III was intended to limit congressional power to 
create standing . . . . [T]he claim that Article III bars citizen standing–once 
Congress has created it–seems most adventurous as a matter of history.”  Id. at 
178. 
35 Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-
Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1988) (reaching the conclusion based on 
“a painstaking search of the historical material”). 
36 Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist 
Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1331 (2006).  Mashaw recounts, 
among other examples, a 1790 statute requiring district judges to appoint three 
mariners to inspect vessels upon petition by the crew.  Id. 
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The concept of standing can be traced to early twentieth 
century cases.  Beginning in 1922, several cases held that 
individual citizens could not challenge the constitutionality of 
statutes unless they held a personal stake in their 
implementation (beyond paying taxes).37  However, in the mid-
1930s, leading texts on Article III power still did not discuss the 
concept of standing.38 
“Standing” as a doctrine developed in conjunction with the 
emergence of the modern administrative state.39  The 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),40 passed in 1946, created 
a framework for accessing the courts for review of agency action 
that comports with the “legal injury” conception of standing.  It 
provides: “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency 
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action 
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial 
review thereof.”41  In other words, citizens have standing if their 
common law or statutory interests are at stake, or if a statute 
specifically confers standing upon them.42 
Administrative law further drove the development of standing 
doctrine as courts responded to a growing perception of agency 
capture by recognizing that beneficiaries of regulations, as well 
as regulated entities, could suffer legal injuries resulting from 
agency action.43  A significant case in the development of 
modern environmental law, Scenic Hudson Preservation 
Conference v. Federal Power Commission,44 illustrates the 
recognition that a legal wrong under the APA could include 
injuries suffered from failure to properly regulate.  The Second 
Circuit reasoned: 
In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will 
adequately protect the public interest in the aesthetic, 
conservational, and recreational aspects of power 
 
37 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487–89 (1923); Fairchild v. 
Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922). 
38 Winter, supra note 35, at 1376 n.23. 
39 Sunstein, supra note 34, at 179. 
40 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006). 
41 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). 
42 Sunstein, supra note 34, at 183–84. 
43 See id. at 184. 
44 Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 615–17 
(2d Cir. 1965). 
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development, those who by their activities and conduct have 
exhibited a special interest in such areas, must be held to be 
included in the class of “aggrieved” parties under [the Federal 
Power Act judicial review provision].  We hold that the 
Federal Power Act gives petitioners a legal right to protect 
their special interests.45 
One case in the vein of protecting regulatory beneficiaries, 
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. 
Camp, transformed the concept of injury from one of “legal 
injury”46 to the now-commonly-known concept of “injury in 
fact.”  In an opinion that has been described as “remarkably 
sloppy,”47 but has nonetheless been extremely influential, Justice 
William O. Douglas sought to widen the courthouse doors by 
permitting access to anyone who suffered an “injury in fact” and 
was “arguably within the zone of interests” of the statute under 
which the regulations at issue were promulgated.48  Shortly 
thereafter, the Court articulated the need for a causal link 
between the defendant’s action and the injury, as well as a 
demonstration that the court could redress the harm.49 
With some notable exceptions, standing in federal courts has 
been grounded largely in a private law, dispute resolution-model 
of litigation typified by a standard personal injury case.  Yet, 
“[a]ll public enforcement of law, including environmental citizen 
suits, serves a public education function by highlighting the 
values society chooses to protect.”50  Thus, a conception of 
standing based on this public law understanding of adjudication 
as an elucidation and enforcement of social values would look to 
“whether the common law, a statute, or the Constitution grants 
the plaintiff a cause of action, not whether the plaintiff has 
 
45 Id. at 616. 
46 Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970). 
47 Sunstein, supra note 34, at 185. 
48 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153. 
49 According to Steven Winter, “[t]he causation/redressibility requirement first 
appeared in Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617–18 (1973), and was 
constitutionalized in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975).”  Winter, supra note 
35, at 1373 n.9. 
50 Robin Kundis Craig, Removing “The Cloak of a Standing Inquiry”: Pollution 
Regulation, Public Health, and Private Risk in the Injury-in-Fact Analysis, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 184 (2007). 
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suffered some particular form of personal harm.”51  Professor 
Daniel Farber has identified the tension between this private law 
model and the public law paradigm of litigation, exemplified by 
school desegregation cases, as underlying the puzzling and 
difficult aspects of applying modern standing doctrine.52  The 
challenge presented to the traditional, private law model of 
litigation is apparent in many administrative law cases, 
particularly where citizens sue regulators to retain or ensure 
benefits from regulatory action.  Moreover, when the suit 
involves protection of the environment, the injury-causation-
redressability concepts may be even further removed from the 
direct physical or financial injuries underlying tort and contract 
litigation.  Perhaps for this reason, many significant 
developments in standing doctrine since its modern articulation 
in the 1970s have grown from environmental cases. 
B.  Environmental Standing 
The passage of major environmental statutes in the early 
1970s included creation of innovative “citizen suit” provisions 
designed to provide an avenue for the public to challenge agency 
and industry actions impacting the environment.  The CAA, for 
example, provides that “any person may commence a civil action 
on his own behalf” against an entity violating the Act or “against 
the [agency] where there is alleged a failure of the [agency] to 
perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not 
discretionary.”53 
From the early 1970s onward, environmental law cases have 
played a large role in the development of standing 
jurisprudence.  In 1972, the Court applied the “injury in fact” 
test of Data Processing and dismissed on standing grounds a 
Sierra Club challenge to development in the Sierra Nevada 
Mountains for failure to demonstrate that the plaintiffs 
 
51 Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Litigation After Laidlaw, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10,516, 10,518 (2000). 
52 Id. 
53 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2006).  One of the provisions that underlies the 
Massachusetts case states such a non-discretionary duty: “The Administrator shall 
by regulation prescribe . . . standards applicable to . . . any air pollutant from any 
class . . . of new motor vehicle[s] . . . which in his judgment cause . . . air pollution 
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 
7521(a)(1). 
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themselves would suffer injury.54  Yet, the Court explicitly 
recognized that “[a]esthetic and environmental well-being . . . 
are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society” 
and damage to those interests “may amount to an ‘injury in fact’ 
sufficient to lay the basis for standing under § 10 of the APA.”55  
Justice Blackmun, in dissent, would have gone further.  He 
argued for an “imaginative expansion of our traditional concepts 
of standing in order to enable an organization . . . [with] 
pertinent, bona fide, and well-recognized attributes and 
purposes in the area of environment” to have standing to litigate 
environmental issues.56  Justice Douglas, dissenting, would have 
“allowed environmental issues to be litigated before federal 
agencies or federal courts in the name of the inanimate object 
about to be despoiled . . . where injury is the subject of public 
outrage.”57 
Among the distinguishing and animating features of 
environmentalism, and thus to some extent the application of 
environmental law, is the concept of ecological interdependence.  
As Jonathan Cannon recently explained: “Environmentalists 
share a belief that humans and things in nature are closely 
interconnected and that human intervention affecting one part 
of a human-natural system can be expected to have deleterious 
effects elsewhere in the system.”58  If accepted, this “ecological 
model” has important implications for standing.  Litigation to 
combat harm in terms of this ecological model requires 
acceptance of injury-causation-redressability relationships 
foreign to the private law, dispute resolution-centered approach. 
The Supreme Court came closest to endorsing such an 
ecological model of standing in United States v. Students 
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP).59  In that 
 
54 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733–35 (1972). 
55 Id. at 734. 
56 Id. at 757 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
57 Id. at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees 
Have Standing?–Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 
(1972) (the most famous articulation of this proposal for grounding standing in non-
human interests, which Justice Douglas cited in his dissent). 
58 Jonathan Cannon, Environmentalism and the Supreme Court: A Cultural 
Analysis, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363, 369 (2006). 
59 United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures 
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
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case, the Court held that the trial court correctly denied a 
motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiffs’ pleadings, if 
proved, established standing for a challenge to railroad rate 
adjustments by users of the environment around the 
Washington, D.C. area.60  The plaintiffs argued that the change 
would lead to a decrease in recycling and an attendant increase 
in resource consumption and pollution by manufacturers.61  In 
SCRAP, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had “alleged a 
specific and perceptible harm that distinguished them from other 
citizens who had not used the natural resources that were 
claimed to be affected.”62  Although the SCRAP Court 
acknowledged that the injury alleged was attenuated, it reasoned 
that the defendants had not challenged the truth of the 
allegations and that the matter was decided on a motion to 
dismiss.63  It was, therefore, little more than a tentative embrace 
of a system-based theory of standing. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, environmentalists used 
citizen suit provisions of major environmental statutes to 
challenge agency actions that threatened the future of 
environmental law.  These suits were particularly important in 
the 1980s as environmentalists sought to counteract the hostility 
of Reagan administration officials to environmental regulation.64 
III 
STANDING NARROWS 
In the 1990s, standing became sharply more restrictive.  This 
occurred most notably in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.65  Like 
Massachusetts, Defenders involved challenges to government 
action concerning international environmental issues. 
 
60 Id. at 685. 
61 Id. at 679–80.  A later majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist described 
SCRAP as “[p]robably the most attenuated injury conferring Article III standing” 
and “the very outer limit of the law.”  Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158, 159 
(1990).  On Chief Justice Rehnquist’s view of environmental law, see James R. May 
& Robert L. Glicksman, Justice Rehnquist and the Dismantling of Environmental 
Law, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,585 (2006). 
62 SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 689. 
63 See id. at 688–90. 
64 E.g., Nancy S. Marks, Citizen Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 29 ENV’T 5 
(June 1987). 
65 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
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A.  Lack of Globally Significant Environmental Precedent 
The U.S. Supreme Court has rarely addressed environmental 
issues of global or even international concern.  In no instance 
prior to Massachusetts has the Court discussed the importance of 
global environmental concerns to federal regulation.  This 
section will briefly highlight some of the Court’s earlier 
jurisprudence addressing international environmental issues, in 
which the Court has generally upheld federal action. 
Perhaps the first international environmental law case to 
reach the Supreme Court was Missouri v. Holland, in which the 
Court upheld the Migratory Bird Treaty Act–a statute 
implementing the Migratory Bird Treaty–on the basis of the 
federal treaty power.66  In the opinion, Justice Holmes described 
migratory birds as “a national interest of very nearly the first 
magnitude . . . [that] can be protected only by national action in 
concert with that of another power.”67 
In 1986, the Court issued perhaps its first opinion concerning 
global environmental issues, Japan Whaling Association v. 
American Cetacean Society.68  The case involved a congressional 
requirement that the Secretary of Commerce certify to the 
President when a foreign country diminishes the effectiveness of 
an international fishery conservation program.69  
Conservationists argued that Japanese actions diminished the 
effectiveness of the International Convention for the Regulation 
of Whaling and commenced litigation to compel certification.70  
The district court and Court of Appeals held that certification 
was required; the Supreme Court reversed.71 
Notably, in Japan Whaling, the Court concluded that the issue 
was justiciable despite an argument by the Japanese petitioners 
that it involved a nonjusticiable political question.72  The Court 
 
66 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
67 Id. at 435. 
68 Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986).  Justice 
Marshall, in dissent, characterized whaling as an issue of “intense worldwide 
concern.”  Id. at 242 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
69 Id. at 226 (majority opinion). 
70 Id. at 228–29.  See also International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72. 
71 Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 228–29. 
72 Id. at 229. 
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reasoned that the issue at hand was an interpretation of the 
statute requiring certification and that “we cannot shirk this 
responsibility merely because our decision may have significant 
political overtones.”73  The Article III issues of injury, causation 
and redressability were not raised.  On the merits, however, the 
Court invoked Chevron deference to uphold the Secretary’s 
determination that certification was not automatically required 
because the petitioners were undisputedly violating the 
Convention.74   
B.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 
The next major case involving global environmental concerns, 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, would reveal the power of the 
standing doctrine to remove U.S. courts from international 
environmental issues addressed by federal agencies.75  The lead 
opinion reflects a theory of standing developed by Justice 
Antonin Scalia at least a decade earlier. 
In 1983, then-Judge Scalia presented a controversial and 
historically questionable76 portrait of standing in his article, “The 
Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation 
of Powers.”77  Drawing on several cases, beginning with Marbury 
v. Madison,78 Scalia argues against the “overjudicialization of the 
process of self-governance.”79  He calls for a return to “the 
traditional requirement that the plaintiff’s alleged injury be a 
particularized one, which sets him apart from the citizenry at 
large.”80  In Scalia’s view, standing in administrative law should 
be limited primarily to the objects of regulation in order to 
prevent the courts from prescribing agency actions designed to 
 
73 Id. at 231. 
74 Id. at 233 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). 
75 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
76 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 34, at 214 (“As a matter of history . . . Scalia’s 
claim is not sound; in fact, it is baseless.”). 
77 Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the 
Separation of Powers., 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983). 
78 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
79 Scalia, supra note 77, at 881. 
80 Id. at 881–82. 
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serve the interests of the majority.81  Although Scalia recognizes 
that a “legal rights” concept of standing prevailed into the 1970s, 
he views that concept through a private-law lens that frequently 
would not permit the beneficiaries of regulation to gain access to 
the courts despite statutory authorization.82  He grounds his 
standing analysis in constitutional separation of powers 
concerns. 
The view of standing articulated by then-Judge Scalia stands 
in opposition to the ecological world view’s assessment of 
systemic effects related to a multitude of inputs.  Scalia’s 
conception of standing also has grave implications for the 
justiciability of globally important environmental issues affected 
by domestic regulation. 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife involved the application of the 
Endangered Species Act83 to foreign aid decisions that could 
hasten the extirpation of species throughout the globe.84  Justice 
Scalia, writing for a majority, determined that the plaintiffs 
failed to demonstrate sufficient injury because their standing 
affidavits: 
[P]lainly contain no facts . . . showing how damage to the 
species will produce “imminent” injury to [them].  That the 
women “had visited” the areas of the projects before the 
projects commenced proves nothing. . . .  Past exposure to 
illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or 
controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by 
any continuing, present adverse effects.  And the affiants’ 
profession of an “inten[t]” to return to the places they had 
visited before–where they will presumably, this time, be 
deprived of the opportunity to observe animals of the 
endangered species–is simply not enough.  Such “some day” 
intentions–without any description of concrete plans, or 
indeed even any specification of when the some day will be–
do not support a finding of the “actual or imminent” injury 
that our cases require.85 
 
81 Id. at 894.  For a very effective refutation of these claims, see Sunstein, supra 
note 34. 
82 See Scalia, supra note 77, at 897. 
83 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1534 (2006). 
84 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
85 Id. at 564 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original). 
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Justice Scalia also explicitly (and derisively) rejected systemic 
theories of standing, which averred that standing existed because 
of the nexus between the alleged injuries to the species and the 
plaintiffs’ use of related ecosystems, the plaintiffs’ interest in the 
species, and the plaintiffs’ professional interest in the species.86 
Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice Scalia also 
concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate redressability.  
He reasoned that the Court could only order the Fish and 
Wildlife Service to require consultation by regulation, but it was 
not clear whether agencies providing foreign aid would be 
bound to follow such regulation.87  He also relied on the limited 
percentage of aid that flows from U.S. agencies for any given 
project–observing that removal of such aid might not stop the 
project–to conclude that redressability was not shown.88 
Finally, Justice Scalia, writing a section adopted by the 
majority, rejected a view of citizen suits that would afford 
standing on a procedural rights theory,89 although he did observe 
in a footnote that standing may be relaxed in certain “procedural 
rights” cases.90  He rejected an effort to distinguish taxpayer 
standing and similar cases based on the fact that those cases 
involved a purported constitutional right, whereas the Defenders 
plaintiffs sought enforcement of a statutory duty.91 
In one of the more revealing passages in Defenders, Justice 
Scalia reasoned that regulatory beneficiaries ordinarily should 
face a much higher burden to show standing, effectively 
suggesting that courts should be more solicitous of regulated 
polluters than the environmentalist public.  He stated: 
When the suit is one challenging the legality of government 
action or inaction, the nature and extent of facts that must be 
averred (at the summary judgment stage) or proved (at the 
trial stage) in order to establish standing depends considerably 
upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or 
forgone action) at issue.  If he is, there is ordinarily little 
question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and 
that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress 
 
86 Id. at 565–67. 
87 Id. at 568–71. 
88 Id. at 571. 
89 Id. at 571–73. 
90 Id. at 571 n.7. 
91 Id. at 573–76. 
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it.  When, however, as in this case, a plaintiff’s asserted injury 
arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or 
lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed.  In 
that circumstance, causation and redressability ordinarily 
hinge on the response of the regulated (or regulable) third 
party to the government action or inaction–and perhaps on 
the response of others as well.92 
Thus, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Defenders can be understood 
to reject standing on at least two theoretical bases, both of them 
unfavorable to environmental interests and particularly global 
environmental concerns.  The opinion employs a strictly localist 
approach to the nexus between the plaintiff and the alleged 
harm,93 and it makes regulatory beneficiary standing contingent 
on the response of regulated entities. 
Justice Kennedy, writing separately, agreed that the plaintiffs 
had not demonstrated an injury.94  He noted, “it may seem trivial 
to require that [plaintiffs] acquire airline tickets to the project 
sites or announce a date certain upon which they will return,” 
but he was apparently not troubled by that implication.95  
Importantly, however, Justice Kennedy concluded that standing 
had not been demonstrated through a much more contextual, ad 
hoc analysis than Justice Scalia’s opinion and that “in different 
circumstances a nexus theory similar to those proffered here 
might support a claim to standing.”96  Further, Justice Kennedy 
did not join the redressability analysis and, although he 
concurred in the rejection of a procedural rights theory in this 
case, he urged that “[a]s [g]overnment programs and policies 
become more complex and farreaching, we must be sensitive to 
the articulation of new rights of action that do not have clear 
analogs in our common-law tradition.”97  He observed: “Modern 
 
92 Id. at 561–62 (emphasis in original). 
93 See Daniel A. Farber, Stretching the Margins: The Geographic Nexus in 
Environmental Law, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1247, 1249–54 (1996). 
94 Defenders, 504 U.S. at 579–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Stevens 
disagreed with both the injury and redressability analysis, although he concurred on 
different grounds.  Id. at 581–85 (Stevens, J., concurring).  Justices Blackmun and 
O’Connor dissented. 
95 Id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
96 Id. at 579 (citing Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 
231 n.4 (1986)). 
97 Id. at 580. 
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litigation has progressed far from the paradigm of Marbury suing 
Madison to get his commission.”98 
As in many other areas, Justice Kennedy has become a central 
swing vote in environmental standing cases.  In fact, “[e]ver 
since joining the Court in 1987, Justice Kennedy has been the 
most significant Justice in environmental cases, at least to the 
extent that he has been in the majority more often than any 
other Justice, often providing the decisive fifth vote.”99  The 
importance of his concurrence in Defenders, while not 
necessarily clear in 1992, has gained prominence through 
Massachusetts.100 
Some commentators, such as Cass Sunstein, argued vigorously 
that the strict standing doctrine announced by Justice Scalia in 
Defenders had no foundation in history or the Constitution.101  
Nonetheless, Justice Scalia’s opinion–tempered somewhat by 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion–drove discussion of 
standing doctrine for years.  It has thus far served as a definitive 
death-knell for a broad public law conception of standing in 
environmental cases adjudicated by the federal courts. 
Defenders remains the Court’s strongest endorsement of a rigid, 
fact-based, localist injury inquiry and rejection of legislative 
power to create standing as a matter of constitutional law. 
Chief Justice Roberts was in the Justice Department at the 
time of Defenders and, shortly after entering private practice in 
1993, authored an essay strongly supporting Justice Scalia’s 
opinion.102  He reasoned: 
If Congress directs the federal courts to hear a case in which 
the requirements of Article III are not met, that Act of 
Congress is unconstitutional.  Defenders is apparently the first 
Supreme Court case to so hold because of lack of Article III 
 
98 Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)). 
99 Richard J. Lazarus, Human Nature, the Laws of Nature, and the Nature of 
Environmental Law, 24 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 231, 250 (2005). 
100 See infra Part V.A. 
101 Sunstein, supra note 34, at 214; see also Philip Weinberg, Are Standing 
Requirements Becoming a Great Barrier Reef Against Environmental Actions?, 7 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 12 (1999) (“[T]he Court in [Defenders of Wildlife] and [Steel 
Co.] inflated Article III’s case or controversy mandate beyond any conceivable 
intent on the part of the founders.”). 
102 John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 
1219 (1993). 
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standing, but the conclusion that Article III limits 
congressional power can hardly be regarded as remarkable.103 
The deeper issue is whether Article III rigidly constrains the 
federal judiciary to a narrow dispute resolution function.  By 
deciding this question in the affirmative, Defenders was an 
obvious and widely recognized restriction of standing for 
regulatory beneficiaries, particularly environmental interests.104 
Justice Scalia authored a similarly restrictive plurality opinion 
in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment.105  In that case, 
the Court held that a claim asserted by private plaintiffs under 
the citizen suit provision of the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA)106 was not 
justiciable because it lacked redressability.107  The defendant had 
undisputedly violated the requirements of EPCRA.108  Justice 
Scalia’s plurality opinion dismissed the citizen action by rejecting 
arguments that redressability would be satisfied by declaratory 
relief, an order authorizing the plaintiff to inspect the 
defendant’s facility, an order compelling the defendant to 
provide the plaintiff with compliance reports, assessment of civil 
penalties against defendant or an award of litigation costs to the 
plaintiff.109  In essence, Justice Scalia’s opinion suggested that 
past violations of an environmental statute are not justiciable 
unless the plaintiff can point to a direct and personal benefit that 
would flow from successful litigation.110 
The environmental community, among others, welcomed the 
softening of Defenders’ approach to standing that came in 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services 
(TOC), Inc.111  In that case, the Court held that an environmental 
 
103 Id. at 1226. 
104 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 34; Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, 
and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141 (1993). 
105 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). 
106 Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 11001–11050 (2006). 
107 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 105. 
108 Id. at 87–88. 
109 Id. at 105–08. 
110 See id. at 127 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
111 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 
(2000). See generally Farber, supra note 51; Alberto B. Lopez, Laidlaw and the 
Clean Water Act: Standing in the Bermuda Triangle of Injury in Fact, Environmental  
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group demonstrated standing by providing affidavits from its 
members attesting that they did not use a river for recreation 
because of the polluted smell and appearance, attributable to 
Laidlaw’s discharges in violation of the Clean Water Act.112  The 
majority reasoned that civil penalties, paid to the government, 
were sufficient to demonstrate redressability “[t]o the extent 
that they encourage defendants to discontinue current violations 
and deter them from committing future ones.”113  Justices Scalia 
and Thomas, in dissent, disagreed with all three prongs of the 
majority’s standing analysis.114  The primary significance of the 
majority opinion is that, compared with the lead opinions in 
Defenders and Steel Co., it “broaden[ed] the concepts of injury 
and redressability enough to provide reasonable protection for 
public values” while retaining a private law, dispute-resolution 
model of the judicial role.115 
In sum, while Defenders grounded a strict, private law concept 
of standing in Article III, Laidlaw suggested that the Court was 
struggling to reconcile this rigid test with the need to recognize 
and vindicate public values expressed through environmental 
laws.  Laidlaw’s impact on suits against government defendants 
was unclear, however, because it involved an action against a 
polluter, whereas Defenders involved a suit by regulatory 
beneficiaries against an agency.  Further, Laidlaw turned on a 
discrete local injury, whereas the Defenders plaintiffs sought 
recognition of a diffuse, internationally important harm.  Thus, a 
high probability existed that in cases mirroring those aspects of 
Defenders, plaintiffs could not prove standing.  Massachusetts 
was such a case. 
 
Harm, and “Mere” Permit Exceedances, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 159 (2000); Emily 
Longfellow, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services: A New Look 
at Environmental Standing, 24 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 3, 5 (2000) (“While 
the Court does not return to the initial receptive welcome it gave environmental 
plaintiffs in the early 1970s, Laidlaw signals that plaintiffs will no longer be denied 
access to court due to an overly stringent application of standing.”). 
112 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 182–83. 
113 Id. at 186. 
114 Id. at 198 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
115 Farber, supra note 51, at 10,520. 
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C.  Environmental Standing in the Court: Some Pre-
Massachusetts Conclusions 
To a large extent, “the Court’s standing doctrine and its 
environmental jurisprudence have evolved together.”116  Despite 
the major role played by environmental law in the development 
of standing since the 1970s, some commentators contend that the 
Court has failed to adequately address the significance of 
environmental law’s development for other areas of law. 
Commenting on the unprecedented insight into Court 
deliberations provided by the release of Justice Blackmun’s 
papers, Professor Richard Lazarus observes that, “wholly absent 
from both the public and now private documents is any 
significant awareness by any member of the Court of the 
distinctive nature of environmental law and the import of its 
emergence on other intersecting areas of law.”117  He also 
observes that “[t]he vast majority of environmental law cases 
before the Supreme Court are . . . focused on jurisdictional 
disputes between competing lawmaking authorities.”118 
For most of the roughly 35-year history of modern statutory 
environmental law, the Court has “seize[d] on the kinds of 
jurisdictional disputes that dominate much of environmental law 
without any appreciation for how and why the disputes are 
raised.”119  For example, Professor Jody Freeman notes that in 
deciding Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.,120 which involved a controversial environmental 
law question (although it is best known for its approach to 
judicial review of agency decisions), the Court “fail[ed] to 
engage meaningfully with the environmental implications of the 
case.”121  Thus, when addressing potentially ground-breaking 
 
116 Cannon, supra note 58, at 381 (noting that “[m]any if not most of the Court’s 
important standing decisions over the past thirty years have come in environmental 
cases”). 
117 Lazarus, supra note 99, at 257. 
118 Id. at 241–42, 247 (“The vast majority of environmental law cases before the 
Supreme Court are . . . focused on jurisdictional disputes between competing 
lawmaking authorities.”). 
119 Id. at 248. 
120 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
121 Jody Freeman, The Story of Chevron: Environmental Law and Administrative 
Discretion, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 171, 195 (Richard J. Lazarus & 
Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005). 
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problems in environmental disputes, the Court has generally 
focused on non-environmental aspects of the cases and, it seems, 
sought to limit the extent to which environmental law creates 
changes in other areas of law.  Thus, the apparent disconnect 
between an ecologically attuned worldview and standing 
doctrine may result from an inadequate synthesis of the unique 
features of environmental law into the intersecting doctrine of 
standing. 
Further, certain Justices, most notably Justice Scalia, exhibit a 
nearly overt hostility to environmental values.122  They “have 
worked to narrow standing as a way of limiting access to the 
courts for those purporting to represent the ‘public interest.’”123  
Their view of standing can be understood as a “reject[ion of] an 
ecological world view” or, perhaps more importantly for 
development of constitutional law, an effort “to limit [the 
ecological world view’s] implications for institutional 
arrangements between branches of government, between state 
and federal governments, and between governments and 
individual property owners.”124  Given the rise of global 
environmental problems and the internationally significant 
context of Defenders, one can add the relationship of global 
concerns to domestic agency decisions to the list of institutional 
implications of environmental litigation that the Defenders 
majority sought to limit.  Thus, Justice Scalia’s opinion seems an 
effort to cabin the impact of environmental law and values by 
limiting the ability to challenge environmentally deleterious 
agency decisions.  To put it more forcefully, as Justice Blackmun 
wrote in Defenders, Justice Scalia’s opinion “amounts to a slash-
 
122 For example, commenting on Defenders in a systematic assessment of the 
Court’s environmental cases, Jonathan Cannon observes: 
[I]n the world evoked by Justice Scalia in [Defenders], effects of actions are 
presumed to be discrete, limited to particular locales and indeed individual 
creatures.  Justice Scalia’s rhetorically heightened castigation of the various 
‘nexus’ theories seemed intended to marginalize, if not reject entirely, injury 
arguments based on the genetic commons or on ecosystem effects and the 
interdependence model that those arguments assume. 
Cannon, supra note 58, at 384; see also Farber, supra note 93, at 1251–52. 
123 Cannon, supra note 58, at 380. 
124 Id. at 407. 
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and-burn expedition through the law of environmental 
standing.”125 
Defenders’ impact on the theory underlying environmental 
standing is fundamentally important.126  It limited the potential 
for environmental cases to have a transformative impact on 
other areas of the law by demanding conformity with an ill-
fitting and unnecessary concept of judicial authority.127 
Several years after Defenders, retired D.C. Circuit Judge 
Patricia Wald characterized that case as a “jurisprudential 
wonder” and stated that “it is truly time to reconceptualize 
environmental standing. . . . [S]urely the incorporation into our 
law of more realistic notions of which affected persons or 
communities have the right to protest environmental violations 
 
125 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 606 (1992) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting).  Interestingly, Justice Blackmun closed his opinion with a quotation 
from Marbury v. Madison, the most foundational case relied upon by Justice Scalia 
for his more restrictive view: “[T]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in 
the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he 
receives an injury.”  Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 
(1803)). 
126 See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 101, at 12 (“The distortion of . . . Article III in 
environmental litigation will, if unchecked, greatly hamstring enforcement of laws 
aimed at safeguarding public health . . . .”).  The practical impact of Defenders on 
citizen suits is unclear.  One commentator argued: 
Jurisdictional hurdles erected by the Supreme Court have fundamentally 
altered the concept of the citizen suit . . . . [T]he environmental citizen 
plaintiff must have the resources and capacity to extensively research and 
allege proof of a direct and personalized injury, that the injury is ongoing, 
and that the form of relief is recognized by the Supreme Court. 
Cassandra Stubbs, Is the Environmental Citizen Suit Dead?  An Examination of the 
Erosion of Standards of Justiciability for Environmental Citizen Suits, 26 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 77, 130 (2000–2001).  On the other hand, a study of 
citizen enforcement actions between 1995 and 2000 concluded that small local 
groups and franchises brought the majority of citizen enforcement actions in the 
study period and that “citizens are acting as private attorneys general in accordance 
with Congress’ intent.”  Kristi M. Smith, Who’s Suing Whom?: A Comparison of 
Government and Citizen Suit Environmental Enforcement Actions Brought Under 
EPA-Administered Statutes, 1995–2000, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 359, 385, 395 
(2004).  All in all, the impact of Justice Scalia’s restrictive view of environmental 
standing appears to have been limited by district and circuit courts, at least in cases 
of concrete localized harm.  Stubbs, supra, at 98–106.  Laidlaw essentially condoned 
this reading of Defenders.  See Smith, supra, at 104. 
127 Cf. Craig, supra note 50, at 184 (“[T]he manufacture of . . . standing [based on 
the most easily concretely established injury] . . . distracts the courts, the regulators, 
and–most importantly–the general public from the more fundamental purposes of 
the pollution control statutes.”). 
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is subject to rethinking.”128  Discussing a mismatch between 
competing visions of litigation as dispute resolution and a forum 
for the defense of public values, particularly as it relates to suits 
against industry, Professor Daniel Farber noted that “[t]he 
messiness of th[e] compromise [between the two visions] is 
nowhere more clear than in environmental law.”129  Despite the 
promise of Laidlaw and its recognition that injury-in-fact may 
include “changes in the relationship between the individual and 
a natural resource[,]” Farber did not see Laidlaw as sufficiently 
transformative to signal “the dawning of a new day for 
environmental litigation.”130  Laidlaw, despite its role in checking 
the dramatic narrowing of standing threatened by Defenders, did 
not signal any greater attention to the systemic importance of 
environmental law.  Instead, it softened Defenders by 
contextualizing the inquiry into injury-in-fact.  Jonathan Cannon 
has similarly concluded that Laidlaw “revive[d] in some limited 
measure the ecological model” of injury rejected in Defenders, 
but it was “by no means a reprise of SCRAP.”131 
In 2005, after noting the Court’s apparent inattention to the 
significance of environmental law for standing doctrine, 
Professor Lazarus observed: 
The real disconnect is . . . between the Court’s precedential 
touchstone for identifying the requisite injury for Article III 
standing and the kinds of causal connections sought to be 
vindicated by modern environmental protection law.  It is 
incumbent upon the Court itself to bridge that gap and return 
to Article III’s basic requirement of ensuring an adequately 
adversarial judicial proceeding, lest the Constitution be 
unfairly read as presenting an insurmountable obstacle to the 
enforcement of important federal environmental mandates.132 
In important respects, Massachusetts serves as an answer to 
Lazarus’ call. 
 
128 Patricia M. Wald, Environmental Postcards From the Edge: The Year That 
Was and the Year That Might Be, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,182, 10,186 (1996). 
129 Farber, supra note 51, at 10,521. 
130 Id. at 10,516, 10,522. 
131 Cannon, supra note 58, at 386; see also Lopez, supra note 111, at 162 (“[T]he 
Court did little to quell the confusion regarding the standing of citizen suit 
plaintiffs.”). 
132 Lazarus, supra note 99, at 260. 
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IV 
MASSACHUSETTS: STANDING FOR A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
ISSUE 
In Massachusetts, the Court held that the plaintiffs have 
standing, the CAA authorizes the EPA to regulate carbon 
dioxide emissions from new vehicles, and EPA’s reasons for 
declining to regulate were insufficient.133  Although both the 
jurisdictional analysis and the holdings on the merits are 
explicitly grounded in domestic law, the globally significant 
context of the case pervades the majority’s reasoning. 
The Supreme Court reviewed a decision by the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals that upheld EPA’s denial of the rulemaking 
petition.134  In an opinion by Judge Randolph, the D.C. Circuit 
observed that the Article III standing question in Massachusetts 
presented a “highly unusual circumstance–encountered for the 
first time in this court” because the constitutional jurisdictional 
question and the merits were so closely united.135  Accordingly, 
Judge Randolph proceeded to the merits and determined that, 
assuming the EPA had authority to regulate carbon dioxide, it 
properly declined to exercise such authority.  Judge Sentelle 
concurred in the result, but concluded that “the petitioners have 
not demonstrated the element of injury necessary to establish 
standing under Article III.”136  He reasoned that the petitioners’ 
allegations amounted to a statement that global warming “is 
harmful to humanity at large.  Petitioners are or represent 
segments of humanity at large.  This would appear to me to be 
neither more nor less than the sort of general harm eschewed as 
insufficient to make out an Article III controversy by the 
Supreme Court and lower courts.”137 
In dissent, Judge Tatel applied an analysis similar to the 
approach Justice Stevens would adopt for the Supreme Court 
 
133 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
134 Id. at 1451, rev’g, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
135 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 415 F.3d 50, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d 
127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
136 Id. at 59 (Sentelle, J., concurring). 
137 Id. at 60.  A 2006 comment discussing the justiciability of global warming 
issues cited the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Massachusetts as illustrating the dangers of 
petitioners’ failure to particularize their injury.  Blake R. Bertagna, “Standing” Up 
for the Environment: The Ability of Plaintiffs to Establish Legal Standing to Redress 
Injuries Caused by Global Warming, 2006 BYU L. REV. 415, 437 (2006). 
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majority.138  In Judge Tatel’s view, petitioners had standing, the 
EPA had authority to regulate, and the EPA improperly 
declined to regulate.139 
A.  Recognition of Scientific Consensus 
Justice Stevens’ opinion for the majority begins with 
recognition that “[r]espected scientists believe” that increases in 
carbon dioxide are related to corresponding increases in global 
temperatures.140  He explains the significance of the problem by 
quoting the petition for certiorari, which “[c]all[ed] global 
warming ‘the most pressing environmental challenge of our 
time.’”141  The Court also notes that when the relevant CAA 
provisions were enacted, “the study of climate change was in its 
infancy.”142  The closing of the initial section of the opinion 
reveals the Court’s motivation in hearing the case: 
“Notwithstanding the serious character of th[e] jurisdictional 
argument and the absence of any conflicting decisions construing 
[CAA] § 202(a)(1), the unusual importance of the underlying 
issue persuaded us to grant the writ.”143 
Before addressing the threshold issue of standing, the Court 
recounts both the domestic and international history pertaining 
to the recognition of anthropogenic climate change and efforts 
to regulate greenhouse gases.  The Court notes that Congress 
enacted the Global Climate Protection Act in 1987 and quotes 
Congress’ determination that “‘necessary actions must be 
identified and implemented in time to protect the climate.’”144  
Likewise, Justice Stevens’ opinion emphasizes the growth of 
international scientific consensus on climate change issues, 
observing that “the scientific understanding of climate change 
progressed” as reflected in the IPCC reports commissioned by 
the UN.145  The Court notes that “[d]rawing on expert opinions 
from across the globe, the IPCC concluded [in 1990] that 
 
138 Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 64–66 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
139 Id. 
140 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1446 (2007). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 1447. 
143 Id. (emphasis added). 
144 Id. at 1448 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006)). 
145 Id. 
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emissions resulting from human activities are substantially 
increasing the atmospheric concentrations of . . . greenhouse 
gases [which] will enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on 
average in an additional warming of the Earth’s surface.”146  As 
the Court explains, the coalescence of scientific consensus drove 
legal action: “[r]esponding to the IPCC report, the United 
Nations convened the ‘Earth Summit’ in 1992,” at which the first 
President Bush signed the UNFCCC, which the Senate 
subsequently ratified by unanimous vote.147  Justice Stevens also 
notes the second IPCC report, written in 1995, after which the 
UNFCCC signatories drafted the Kyoto Protocol.148 
The Court highlights the connection between domestic 
understanding and the international consensus, noting that a 
National Research Council report requested by the White 
House, “drawing heavily on the 1995 IPCC report, concluded 
that [g]reenhouse gases are accumulating in Earth’s atmosphere 
as a result of human activities, causing surface air temperatures 
and subsurface ocean temperatures to rise.”149 
B.  Standing 
In its standing analysis, the majority first characterizes the 
question presented as “the proper construction of a 
congressional statute, a question eminently suitable to resolution 
in federal court.”150  Citing the CAA’s citizen suit provision, the 
Court notes congressional authorization for the suit and 
explains, by quotation from Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in 
Defenders, that “‘Congress has the power to define injuries and 
 
146 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 1449.  Despite significant United States involvement in its negotiation, 
the Senate unanimously declared its opposition to entry into the Kyoto Protocol. 
Jehl, supra note 21.  President Bush decided to withdraw from Kyoto and not seek 
ratification in 2001.  Id. 
149 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1450 (internal quotations omitted); see also NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7.  Nonetheless, after concluding that it lacked 
authority to regulate carbon dioxide, the EPA stated that it would decline to 
exercise such authority if it existed because of “residual uncertainty” in the 
National Research Council report and, among other considerations, a concern that 
“unilateral EPA regulation of motor-vehicle greenhouse gas emissions might also 
hamper the President’s ability to persuade key developing countries to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.”  Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1451. 
150 Id. at 1453. 
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articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or 
controversy where none existed before.’”151  Quoting further, the 
Court observes that “it does not matter how many persons have 
been injured by the challenged action, [but] the party bringing 
suit must show that the action injures him in a concrete and 
personal way.”152  The Court then states that Defenders “holds 
that a litigant must demonstrate that it has suffered a concrete 
and particularized injury that is either actual or imminent, that 
the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant, and that it is likely 
that a favorable decision will redress that injury.”153  The Court 
regards as “critical” that “[w]hen a litigant is vested with a 
procedural right, that litigant has standing if there is some 
possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-
causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed 
the litigant.”154 
After this statement of background standing principles that 
suggests a doctrine amenable to ecological models, Justice 
Stevens observes that “[o]nly one of the petitioners needs to 
have standing to permit us to consider the petition for review”155 
and begins a novel analysis of the “considerable relevance that 
the party seeking review here is a sovereign State and not, as it 
was in [Defenders], a private individual.”156  Massachusetts, the 
Court states, has a “well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign 
territory” from sea level rise attributable to global warming.157 
 
151 Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
152 Id. 
153 Id. (quoting Defenders, 504 U.S. at 560–61). 
154 Id. (citing Defenders, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7). 
155 Id. at 1453–54 (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional 
Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52, n. 2 (2006)). 
156 Id. at 1454. 
157 Id. (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999)).  The Court focuses 
primarily on Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907), a case involving 
cross-boundary air pollution, for support.  Justice Stevens writes that “[w]ell before 
the creation of the modern administrative state, we recognized that States are not 
normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction.”  Massachusetts, 
127 S. Ct. at 1454.  As a quasi-sovereign, “‘the State has an interest independent of 
and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.  It has 
the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its 
inhabitants shall breathe pure air.’”  Id. (quoting Georgia, 206 U.S. at 237).  The 
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These two factors, the CAA’s citizen suit provision158 and 
Massachusetts’ status as a state, underlie the most obvious 
innovation of Massachusetts: that the Commonwealth “is 
entitled to special solicitude in [the Court’s] standing analysis.”159  
After explaining these two bases of his analysis, Justice Stevens 
reasons that, “[w]ith that [special solicitude] in mind, it is clear 
that petitioners’ submissions as they pertain to Massachusetts 
have satisfied the most demanding standards of the adversarial 
process.”160  The Court then separately explains injury, causation, 
and redressability.161 
The Court’s injury analysis begins with recognition of globally 
significant impacts of global warming, and then zeros in on a 
concrete, particularized injury.  Quoting from the National 
Research Council report and an expert declaration, Justice 
Stevens recites that scientists believe global warming is causing: 
[T]he global retreat of mountain glaciers, reduction in snow-
cover extent, the earlier spring melting of rivers and lakes, the 
accelerated rate of rise of sea levels during the 20th century 
relative to the past few thousand years . . . severe and 
 
When a State enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives. 
Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions, it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, 
and in some circumstances the exercise of its police powers to reduce in-state 
motor-vehicle emissions might well be pre-empted. 
Id. (citing Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 
607 (1982)).  The state cedes these “sovereign prerogatives” to the federal 
government, and “Congress has ordered [the] EPA to protect Massachusetts 
(among others) by prescribing [CAA automobile emissions standards].”  Id. 
158 See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2006). 
159 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1455.  The creation of “special solicitude” is likely 
to produce extensive academic commentary.  It is useful to bear in mind that in 
shaping the standard, the Court explicitly combined two factors–citizen suit 
authorization and status as a state.  It is not clear that states will be able to call upon 
the standard without benefit of a citizen suit provision.  Thus, it is not clear whether 
special solicitude will impact standing beyond environmental litigation. 
160 Id. (emphasis added). 
161 Id. at 1455–59.  The Court’s special solicitude for Massachusetts begs the 
question whether the remainder of its standing analysis has application to private 
plaintiffs.  In Part V.A, infra, I argue that the analysis does change environmental 
standing doctrine for private plaintiffs because it embraces an ecological model.  It 
is beyond the scope of this Article to assess whether private plaintiffs in cases 
outside of environmental law will benefit. 
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irreversible changes to natural ecosystems . . . and an increase 
in the spread of disease.162 
The opinion then observes that “rising seas have already begun 
to swallow Massachusetts’ coastal land.”163  The Court holds that 
“[b]ecause the Commonwealth owns a substantial portion of the 
state’s coastal property, it has alleged a particularized injury in 
its capacity as a landowner.”164 
Similarly, the majority’s causation analysis acknowledges that 
the domestic greenhouse gas emissions constitute only a portion 
of the problem, yet recognizes a cognizable claim based on the 
U.S. contribution to global emissions.  The Court reasons that  
“EPA’s refusal to regulate [carbon dioxide] emissions 
‘contributes’ to Massachusetts’ injuries,” and rejects the 
argument that, because the impact of such regulation is an 
incremental step, it is insufficient to create standing, stating that 
“accepting that premise would doom most challenges to 
regulatory action.”165  Further, the Court recognizes that 
regulation of new vehicle emissions would not address the entire 
domestic contribution, but rejects as “erroneous” EPA’s 
“assumption that a small incremental step, because it is 
incremental, can never be attacked in a federal judicial forum.”166 
Further, contrary to the implication arising from the plurality 
view in Defenders, the Court accepts that, although the United 
States is only one of the relevant global actors, actions by federal 
environmental agencies can sufficiently redress the harm to 
support standing.  The majority reasons that merely because 
“developing countries such as China and India are poised to 
increase greenhouse gas emissions substantially over the next 
century” does not destroy redressability, noting that “a 
reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace of global 
emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere.”167 
Having concluded that the plaintiffs demonstrated standing 
sufficient to pursue the case, the Court swiftly determines that 
 
162 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1455–56 (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). 
163 Id. at 1456. 
164 Id. (emphasis added). 
165 Id. at 1457. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 1458. 
 
2008] Globalism in Massachusetts v. EPA 105 
carbon dioxide falls within CAA’s definition of a pollutant, then 
turns to EPA’s asserted justifications for declining to regulate 
even if it had authority.168  In essence, Justice Stevens rejected 
EPA’s declination because it “rests on reasoning divorced from 
the statutory text.”169  Importantly, the Court rejected the notion 
that EPA’s decision was shielded from review as a political 
determination because “while the President has broad authority 
in foreign affairs, that authority does not extend to the refusal to 
execute domestic laws.”170  Further, the Court rejected as 
irrelevant EPA’s “prefer[ance] not to regulate greenhouse gases 
because of some residual uncertainty,” reasoning that “[i]f the 
scientific uncertainty is so profound that it precludes EPA from 
making a reasoned judgment as to whether greenhouse gases 
contribute to global warming, EPA must say so.”171  Thus, the 
Court held, “EPA has offered no reasoned explanation for its 
refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute 
to climate change” as required by its duty to determine whether 
carbon dioxide endangers public health or welfare under the 
CAA.172 
Thus, despite precedent strongly disfavoring standing, an 
agency determination on an arguably ambiguous statute, and a 
slate of agency rationales for inaction, the Court sided with 
environmental interests on every point.  Not surprisingly, this 
produced strong dissents and a flurry of commentary. 
C.  The Chief Justice’s Dissent: Revealing the Magnitude of the 
Court’s Decision 
Chief Justice Roberts issued a fifteen-page dissent, joined by 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.173  Reporter Linda 
Greenhouse characterized the opinion as “a declaration of his 
deepest jurisprudential beliefs and highest priorities [that] 
offered the most revealing portrait in the 18-month history of 
 
168 See id. at 1459–62. 
169 Id. at 1462. 
170 Id. at 1463.  The Court also observed that “EPA has made no showing that it 




173 Id. at 1462 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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the Roberts court of the new chief justice at work.”174  The 
passion of this dissent suggests the importance of the majority’s 
standing analysis.  Chief Justice Roberts’ scathing opinion 
accuses the majority of “sleight-of-hand” and chides that the 
Court’s reasoning amounts to “[e]very little bit helps, so 
Massachusetts can sue over any little bit.”175  Chief Justice 
Roberts accuses the majority of failing to take a separation of 
powers based “core component of standing . . . seriously.”176 
Chief Justice Roberts’ view is overstated and does not 
address, among other things, the need for administrative law 
mechanisms that make agencies directly accountable not only to 
regulated entities, which are usually politically powerful, but also 
to regulatory beneficiaries, which are more diffuse and perhaps 
less politically influential.  The impassioned-to-hyperbolic tone 
of some initial academic commentary177 supporting Chief Justice 
Roberts’ view highlights how completely the majority refutes 
efforts (previously lead primarily by Justice Scalia) to entrench 
an exceedingly narrow standing doctrine as a constitutional 
requirement.  Similarly, the incredulous tone of Justice Scalia’s 
dissent (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas 
and Alito) suggests that the majority opinion contains a deep 
concern over the potential impacts of global warming and the 
United States’ failure to combat it: “The Court’s alarm over 
global warming may or may not be justified, but it ought not 
distort the outcome of this litigation.”178  These two components 
of the dissents–alarm over the fundamental changes that may 
flow from the Court’s opinion and a sense that the result was 
driven by more than rote administrative law analysis–highlight 
the importance of the majority’s opinion and the need to look 
deeper to understand its implications. 
 
174 Linda Greenhouse, For the Chief Justice, a Dissent and a Line in the Sand, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, § 4, at 12. 
175 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1470 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
176 Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
177 E.g., Ronald A. Cass, Massachusetts v. EPA: The Inconvenient Truth About 
Precedent, 93 VA. L. REV. In Brief 75, 75 (2007), http://www.virgnialawreview.org/ 
inbrief/2007/05/21/cass.pdf (“[i]n their eagerness to promote government action to 
address global warming, the Justices stretch, twist, and torture administrative law 
doctrines”); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Controlling Greenhouse Gas Emissions From 
Mobile Sources–Massachusetts v. EPA, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,535, 10,537 (2007) 
(“[t]he majority opinion . . . [holds that] political issues are justiciable”). 
178 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1477–78 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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The Chief Justice presents a much narrower view of standing 
than the majority; a view that largely mirrors Justice Scalia’s 
opinion in Defenders.179  Upon reading the dissent, it seems that 
questions pertaining to global warming could never be 
justiciable in the eyes of these Justices.  Chief Justice Roberts 
writes: “The very concept of global warming seems inconsistent 
with th[e] particularize[d injury] requirement. Global warming is 
a phenomenon harmful to humanity at large, and the redress 
petitioners seek is focused no more on them than on the public 
generally–it is literally to change the atmosphere around the 
world.”180 
The dissent maintains that the Court’s reliance on “special 
solicitude” for Massachusetts serves as “an implicit concession 
that petitioners cannot establish standing on traditional terms.”181  
He concludes that the majority employs a “sleight-of-hand” by 
“failing to link up the different elements of the three-part 
standing test.”182 
Although the dissent maintains that the alleged loss of coastal 
land “is pure conjecture”183 (which indicates a stunning rejection 
of the scientific consensus on climate change impacts, as well as 
a narrow view of environmental protection in the face of 
uncertainty), Chief Justice Roberts maintains that even if the 
injury exists, “reliance on Massachusetts’s loss of coastal land as 
[petitioners’] injury in fact . . . creates insurmountable problems  
. . . with respect to causation and redressability.”184  The dissent 
 
179 See Defenders, 504 U.S. 555.  Thus, for the same reasons as Justice Scalia’s 
opinion in Defenders, the view Roberts expresses is neither constitutionally 
mandated nor appropriate where administrative agencies wield sweeping power to 
regulate problems of extensive geographic and temporal scope. 
180 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1467 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citations and 
internal quotations omitted). 
181 Id. at 1466. 
182 Id. at 1470. 
183 Id. at 1467.  The dissent asserts that the Court’s reliance on certain scientific 
modeling supplied by petitioners “renders requirements of imminence and 
immediacy utterly toothless” because of the “century-long time horizon and a series 
of compounded estimates.”  Id. at 1468.  Roberts’ efforts to make Massachusetts 
appear as a break from tradition are misleading, however.  The dissent’s view is 
supported primarily by Scalia’s opinion in Defenders and its progeny.  See 
Defenders, 504 U.S. 555.  That view of standing is the true break from traditional 
understandings of standing, as discussed in Part V.A, infra. 
184 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1468 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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would require that petitioners “show a causal connection 
between that specific injury and the lack of new motor vehicle 
greenhouse gas emission standards, and that the promulgation of 
such standards would likely redress that injury.”185  This 
requirement is an impossible hurdle in a context as scientifically 
complex as global warming.  Further, as Jonathan Cannon notes, 
“by separating the several elements of the causal chain and 
demanding particularized proof of each, [Chief Justice Roberts’] 
analysis necessarily rejects the environmentalists’ presumptions 
of fragility, radiating harm, and serious consequence.”186 
The dissent states that the majority “ignores the complexities 
of global warming” in its standing analysis, “using the dire 
nature of global warming itself as a bootstrap for finding 
causation and redressability.”187  However, Chief Justice Roberts 
uses the complexity of global warming in an inverse way, relying 
on it to prevent environmental challenges.  He highlights 
scientific complexity and presents it as an insurmountable 
obstacle to judicial review of any decision pertaining to global 
warming unless it imposes a burden on a regulated industry.188  
No doubt exists that industry will have standing to challenge any 
regulation requiring it to reduce emissions.  Yet, potential 
beneficiaries of such regulations, according to Chief Justice 
Roberts, would have to “trace their alleged injuries back 
through th[e] complex [scientific] web to the fractional amount 
of global emissions that might have been limited with EPA 
standards” to establish standing.189  Thus, for the dissenters, not 
only should the magnitude of the problem prevent 
demonstration of injury, but the magnitude of the system 
through which causation and redressability must be understood, 
as well as the existence of other carbon inputs into the system, 
should free the executive agencies from any judicial review for 
failure to redress a global environmental harm. 
 
185 Id. 
186 Jonathan Z. Cannon, The Significance of Massachusetts v. EPA, 93 VA. L. 
REV. In Brief 53, 56 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/ 
cannon.pdf. 
187 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1468 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
188 See id. at 1468–69. 
189 Id. at 1469. 
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The dissent’s view of standing would, as a matter of 
constitutional law, structure government to disfavor regulation 
that redresses globally important threats under domestic 
environmental statutes by making many decisions not to 
regulate unreviewable while leaving courts open for challenges 
to regulation.  This perversion would, at least in some cases, 
make the availability of judicial review inversely correlate with 
the significance of the issue.  A discrete permit violation could 
be justiciable; a declination to exercise authority to limit 
recognized global harm for the next several centuries would be 
unreviewable. 
Even if Chief Justice Roberts is correct that “[t]he realities 
make it pure conjecture to suppose EPA regulation of new 
automobile emissions will likely prevent the loss of 
Massachusetts coastal land,”190 the fundamental disagreement 
between the majority and dissent is not factual or scientific.  The 
disagreement is over whether the judicial branch has any role to 
play in compelling government regulation of factors that 
contribute to climate change and similarly complex problems.  
The dissent’s view of standing fits only within much simpler and 
more traditional litigation contexts and sets up a test that no 
petitioner advocating regulation of greenhouse gas emissions 
could satisfy. 
Chief Justice Roberts states that “petitioner’s true goal for 
this litigation may be more symbolic than anything else,”191 but 
that summation is incorrect.  What petitioners won was 
substantive victory concerning CAA interpretation, 
transformative analysis of justiciability for environmental 
concerns, and endorsement of climate change science. 
For the dissent, political importance, complexity, and 
uncertainty seem to require judicial abstention.  For the 
majority, it appears that the widespread consensus on the need 
to take action addressing global warming requires that the EPA 
be legally accountable through judicial review of the agency’s 
interpretation of the statute and the reasons underlying its 
decision not to regulate. 
 
190 Id. at 1470 (emphasis in original). 
191 Id. 
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V 
MASSACHUSETTS’ GLOBALISM: STANDING, CONSENSUS AND 
THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC REGULATION 
Richard Lazarus noted shortly after Massachusetts was 
decided, “[i]n its opening paragraph, Justice Stevens’s majority 
opinion makes clear that this is not a routine administrative law 
case.”192  The opening paragraph relates the global importance of 
the case.193  That context affects the majority’s view of 
justiciability as encompassing cases premised on effects to 
complex systems, its virtual endorsement of the consensus 
scientific position, and its recognition of the significance of U.S. 
agency action for global environmental problems. 
The Chief Justice’s dissent broods over aspects of the majority 
opinion that may prove fundamentally important to federal 
courts’ future ability to grapple with complex emerging 
environmental issues.  In this respect, Massachusetts is important 
for at least three advances.  First, the Court turns toward a more 
ecologically attuned doctrine of standing for environmental 
cases.  Second, the Court generally accepts the scientific 
consensus–and at least acknowledges the global legal 
consensus–that has emerged on the mechanism and threat of 
climate change.  Third, building upon that recognition, 
Massachusetts represents the Court’s first acknowledgement of 
the relationship between domestic environmental regulation and 
global environmental harms.  These three points are interrelated 
and they suggest that Massachusetts may have a transformative 
impact on certain environmental litigation. 
A.  Returning Environmental Standing to Its Roots and 
Recognizing Ecological Systems 
Massachusetts is a fundamentally important standing case 
because it supplants the rigid theoretical construct that 
Defenders imported into environmental litigation.  Massachusetts 
moves the Court closer to an earlier, more straightforward vision 
of access to courts, which turns primarily on the availability of a 
legal claim and remedy.  As Jonathan Cannon notes, “The 
 
192 Richard Lazarus, A Breathtaking Result for Greens, 24 ENVTL. FORUM, 
May/June 2007, at 12. 
193 See supra Part III.A. 
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Court’s opinion also reflects sympathy with environmentalist 
beliefs and values to an extent rarely, if ever, seen in the Court’s 
environmental cases.”194  Combined, these points suggest that 
Justice Stevens’ opinion draws upon and incorporates core 
environmental tenants to re-cast the Article III standing analysis 
for cases in which the harm arises through complex 
environmental pathways. 
1.  Embracing an Ecological Model 
In certain environmental cases, members of the Court have 
recognized the significance of environmental values such as the 
interdependence of ecological systems.195  Not since the 1970s, 
however, has the Court shown a willingness to alter general legal 
principles such as standing on the basis of how such principles 
interact with environmental problems and concepts.  
Massachusetts adopts such a view.196  Massachusetts 
reconceptualizes environmental standing to recognize the 
difficulty, perhaps impossibility, of employing a private law 
framework (forcefully endorsed by some Justices) when deciding 
a challenge to agency action impacting complex natural 
systems.197 
 
194 Cannon, supra note 186, at 53. 
195 E.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 723 n.4 (1978) (Powell, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he understanding that the forest includes the creatures that live 
there is confirmed by the modern view of the forest as an interdependent, dynamic 
community of plants and animals . . . .”). 
196 Cannon, supra note 186, at 55 (In Massachusetts, “standing depended on a 
view of the facts consistent with the ecological model.  And that was the view the 
Court embraced.”).  For background on the ecological model, see Cannon, supra 
note 58. 
197 An example of some Justices’ sense of the foreignness of environmental 
problems came in Justice Scalia’s comment during oral argument: “I’m not a 
scientist.  That’s why I don't want to have to deal with global warming, to tell you 
the truth.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120).  A hint that some Justices may 
recognize that environmental harms have been viewed with greater skepticism than 
other harms came in the following comment by Justice Breyer:  
Now what is it in the law that says that somehow a person cannot go to an 
agency and say we want you to do your part?  Would you be up here saying 
the same thing if we’re trying to regulate child pornography, and it turns out 
that anyone with a computer can get pornography elsewhere?  I don’t think 
so. 
Id. at 38–39. 
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As Chief Justice Roberts points out, the Court concludes that 
standing exists without demanding that the relationship between 
injury, causation, and redressability be precisely quantifiable.198  
Thus, the Court recognizes that causation and redressability may 
be satisfied where the agency action would affect scientifically 
complex systems that result in injury of large temporal and 
geographic scales.  The majority does not require measurement 
of when EPA regulation could begin to change the rise in sea 
levels, nor does it assess how much change could be achieved.199  
It is enough that the injury, causal relationship, and possibility of 
redress are proven to exist through accepted scientific 
principles.200 
Similarly, Massachusetts clearly breaks from the restrictive 
conception of redressabilty announced by Justice Scalia in Steel 
Co.201  Even if the EPA regulates vehicle emissions upon 
reconsidering the issue, any directly resulting change in sea level 
will be small and take years to materialize.202  This type of 
redressability is a direct embrace of the systemic ecological 
model of standing: it accepts that changes to one input of a 
system may have real, if diffuse, effects on the system as a whole. 
The Court’s redressability analysis recognizes that the severity 
of the problem, coupled with its diffuse nature and the narrow 
statutory question presented, provide circumstances where 
judicial review will be real, meaningful, and appropriately 
focused on a critical legal question. 
Massachusetts is the type of case that falls within a fair reading 
of the case or controversy requirement, even though it cannot be 
confined to the narrow box of Defenders.  It is a case with a legal 
injury, and the three-prong approach is appropriately adjusted 
to reflect growth in our understanding of human-natural 
interaction.  The Massachusetts analysis suggests a construct of 
standing that is far more suitable to environmental law than 
 
198 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1467 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
199 Id. at 1457–59 (majority opinion). 
200 See infra Part IV.B. (discussing the Court’s recognition of scientific 
consensus).  In addition, the Court does not link any specific component of its 
standing analysis to “special solitcitude.” 
201 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 106–09 (1998). 
202 Although the reconsideration may trigger additional avenues of regulation, 
the Court appropriately does not rest its determination on that possibility.  See 
Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1457–58. 
 
2008] Globalism in Massachusetts v. EPA 113 
Defenders and Steel Co.203  Massachusetts signals a change in 
justiciability theory of significantly broader implication than 
Laidlaw.204 
Massachusetts recognizes the role of federal agencies in 
responding to global environmental problems and shapes 
standing to effectuate review of such actions.  For this and other 
reasons, Massachusetts re-opens the possibility of a public law 
conception of standing for environmental cases.  Such a view 
comports with the understanding of access to courts that 
prevailed from the founding through the 1970s. 
In Massachusetts, the Court re-affirms the viability and 
potential value of the citizen suit.  “Congress has . . . authorized 
this type of challenge to EPA action.  That authorization is of 
critical importance to the standing inquiry: ‘Congress has the 
power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that 
will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed 
before.’”205  The Court’s reinvigoration of the citizen suit and 
removal of Defenders’ barriers can bolster environmental 
interests in a wide range of contexts, unless it is understood to 
provide relaxed standing solely for state petitioners. 
 
203 Environmental cases frequently involve public value determinations 
reflecting evolution of social and legal understanding of the human relationship to 
the environment. 
204 In Laidlaw, the Court “contextualized” the requirements of Defenders and 
similar cases by focusing closely on the facts and by accepting the plaintiff’s 
forbearance due to pollution as a cognizable injury.  See Farber, supra note 51, at 
10,519.  Massachusetts, in contrast, wholeheartedly departs from the rigidity of 
Defenders and, thereby, changes the reference point for employing each of the 
three prongs.  In this respect, to the extent that Laidlaw reflected a “change in 
emphasis, from a rule-based approach to a more common-law, case-by-case 
approach,” id., Massachusetts can be viewed as a return to a more rule-based 
approach, albeit a different type of rule (enabling rather than restricting citizen 
suits).  Justice Stevens’ approach in Massachusetts is also distinguishable from 
Laidlaw in that it focuses on a physical injury, the loss of coastline, rather than a 
more subjective fear of harm.  In this sense, Massachusetts may be less interesting in 
terms of the psychology of injury, see Sunstein, supra note 34, at 188–89, but such 
assessments of injury are a distraction wrought by Defenders’ rigidity more than a 
legally useful inquiry.  See also Craig, supra note 50, at 184. 
205 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453 (citing the CAA citizen suit provision, 42 
U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2006), and quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
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2.  Is the Standing Analysis Limited to States? 
The most important question arising from the Court’s 
standing decision is whether the less restrictive, more 
ecologically attuned view of standing will apply only to state 
plaintiffs, or whether it will apply for all plaintiffs.  In 
environmental cases at least, the better reading–both textually 
and for policy reasons–supports expanded access for all 
plaintiffs.206 
In its reasoning, Massachusetts is plainly a rebuke of the more 
extreme portions of Justice Scalia’s opinion in Defenders.207  
Justice Stevens accepts as sufficient a theory of injury, causation, 
and redressability that, as the dissent notes, would not fit neatly 
within the cramped Defenders framework.208  Rather than 
constraining this view to the special solicitude afforded to 
Massachusetts as a state, the change can be understood as a 
return to the more accommodating view of standing historically 
embraced by the Court and upon which the early environmental 
cases of the 1970s rested.209  Further, Massachusetts fits fairly 
easily within much of the framework of Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion in Defenders, which makes his full participation in the 
majority opinion less than surprising and may undercut the 
likelihood that even Justice Kennedy will limit the framework to 
cases brought by states.210  In stating that the petitioners 
“satisfied the most demanding standards” of standing, Justice 
Stevens makes plain that Massachusetts affects Defenders’ 
 
206 Because the Court grounds Massachusetts’ injury in physical loss of 
coastline–“in its capacity as landowner,” Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1456–and 
recognizes causation and redressability without demanding precise computations, 
see id. at 1457–58, there is little in the opinion that could prevent similarly situated 
private environmental plaintiffs from bringing similar suits–except the “special 
solicitude” afforded to states in the opinion, which is discussed below. 
207 Cf. Jonathan H. Adler, Warming Up to Climate Change Litigation, 93 VA. L. 
REV. In Brief 63, 64–66 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/ 
adler.pdf (“The Court purported to adhere to this ‘most demanding’ standard in 
evaluating Massachusetts’ claims, while actually interpreting Lujan’s requirements 
in a most forgiving way . . . .”). 
208 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1466 n.1 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
209 In this sense, Chief Justice Roberts may be correct that Massachusetts is 
“SCRAP for a new generation.”  Id. at 1471. 
210 See id. at 1453 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
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framework directly and suggests that the new analysis should not 
be limited to cases involving state petitioners.211 
The Court’s opinion does not directly address the threshold 
question of whether this special status is necessary to the 
standing analysis that follows.212  If “special solicitude” is 
necessary for the Court’s standing analysis, it may be that “[b]y 
conferring special litigation status on the state [Attorneys 
General], the Court diminished the litigation role of private 
activist groups by comparison.”213  However, there are sound 
reasons to think that, in environmental cases at least, “special 
solicitude” does not restrict the remainder of the analysis.  For 
one thing, much of Justice Stevens’ standing analysis tracks that 
of Judge Tatel in the D.C. Circuit, which did not invoke special 
status for states.214  More importantly, Justice Stevens grounds 
Massachusetts’ satisfaction of the injury requirement “in its 
capacity as a landowner,”215 not in its quasi-sovereign capacity. 
The Court’s analysis is reminiscent of the legal injury 
approach to standing.  Despite articulation of injury-in-fact, the 
premise of the Court’s conclusion that standing exists is the 
CAA citizen suit provision and the core statutory interpretation 
issue presented.216  Essentially, the Court recognizes the 
“procedural right” in the CAA as the basis for asserting the legal 
injury.217  The Court’s quotation from Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Defenders, particularly the acknowledgement 
that Congress may articulate new legal claims, supports this 
view.218 
 
211 Id. at 1442 (majority opinion). 
212 See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics 
to Expertise, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming) (suggesting that the injury-
causation-redressability analysis will likely affect standing for private parties despite 
the creation of special solicitude); Craig, supra note 50, at 196 (“it is unclear 
whether even the majority intended to change the Lujan standing analysis for 
individual plaintiffs”). 
213 Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA, 
112 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 74 (2007). 
214 See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 415 F.3d 50, 61–67 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(Tatel, J., dissenting), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
215 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1456 (emphasis added). 
216 Id. at 1453. 
217 Id. 
218 See id. Justice Kennedy’s likely role in injecting special solicitude into the 
analysis may also be important.  Justice Kennedy’s environmental jurisprudence  
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“Special solicitude” may be an enabler for states in all 
contexts, but it should not serve as a limitation in environmental 
citizen suits.  The Court embraces a vision of environmental 
injury, causation, and redressability that recognizes the need for 
a doctrine to encompass more than private law models of 
litigation in environmental law.  The model of environmental 
harm and redress embraced by Massachusetts does not logically 
suggest a limited application to governmental beneficiaries of 
environmental regulation. 
By reading Article III to permit litigation of cases relying 
upon an ecological conception of standing, the opinion favors 
access to courts and endorses the possibility that private 
plaintiffs may demand accountability of federal agencies in 
similar circumstances.  On this view, the majority breathes new 
life into citizen suits.219 
In sum, Massachusetts embraces an ecological, systemic view 
of injury-causation-redressability that should permit standing for 
private parties in cases where the harm results from shifts in a 
complex system.  To that extent, its vision of standing 
recognizes, perhaps for the first time in the Court’s 
jurisprudence, that federal agency actions may contribute in a 
reviewable way to the creation of redress for global 
environmental problems that impact U.S. parties. 
B.  Translating Consensus Into Cognizable Claims 
Essential to the Court’s transformation of standing into a 
more environmentally appropriate doctrine is its acceptance of 
 
may be best characterized as “contextualist,” although his preference for states’ 
rights must also be recognized.  Michael C. Blumm & Sherry L. Bosse, Justice 
Kennedy and the Environment: Property, States’ Rights, and a Persistent Search for 
Nexus, 82 WASH. L. REV. 667, 674 (2007).  Given his contextualism, the 
concreteness of the injury relied upon may help to explain why Justice Kennedy 
joins completely in the majority opinion.  Justice Kennedy’s full participation may 
suggest that the ecological model of standing embraced by Massachusetts will be 
more durable than the rigidity of Defenders proved to be.  Further, Justice 
Kennedy’s Defenders concurrence suggests openness to precisely the type of 
“nexus” or interconnectedness theory of standing that underlies Justice Stevens’ 
injury-causation-redressability analysis.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 579 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
219 Notably, it directly relies upon the procedural right afforded by the CAA–
not merely the APA provision more frequently invoked–to explain the basis of 
standing.  Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453. 
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scientific consensus on the question of climate change.  As 
Richard Lazarus noted immediately after the case was decided, 
“the Court uncharacteristically takes sides in the scientific 
debate about climate change, strongly suggesting that there is no 
debate at all.”220  Indeed, debate on the issue has largely been 
political.  In the scientific community, a clear consensus exists 
concerning the mechanisms of climate change221 and the reality 
of the threat it poses.222  That the Court cut through the political 
debate to acknowledge the underlying scientific consensus is 
unusual and, given EPA’s reliance on professed uncertainty, 
very significant.  It is not a political move by the Court, as some 
have suggested,223 but instead represents a potential shift in 
environmental judicial review. 
The Court rules that to decline rulemaking, the EPA must 
“form a scientific judgment” as to endangerment or explicitly 
state that “the scientific uncertainty [on climate change] is so 
profound [as to] preclude[] EPA from making a reasoned 
judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute to global 
warming.”224  Given the Court’s virtual endorsement of the 
scientific consensus in Massachusetts’s opening paragraphs,225 this 
leaves essentially no ground to avoid a scientific stance on the 
issue.  Global scientific consensus thus becomes a touchstone for 
administrative law analysis, a standard against which EPA’s 
future actions may be judged.226  The Court’s endorsement of the 
scientific consensus–evident in its discussion of the IPCC and 
National Research Council reports, as well as virtually all of its 
standing analysis–and its holding the EPA to account for 
 
220 Lazarus, supra note 192; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and 
Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 802 (2007) (observing that “in its standing 
analysis, the Court noted the virtual consensus in the scientific community, as well 
as in the world community, that greenhouse gases contribute to global warming,” 
but that the Court refrained from “expressing its doubt that EPA could show 
profound scientific uncertainty”). 
221 E.g., Oreskes, supra note 11. 
222 See IPCC REPORT, supra note 7, at 6. 
223 See supra note 177. 
224 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1463 (2007). 
225 See supra Part III.A. 
226 Less clearly, but potentially more importantly, a similar analysis may be 
applied to the Court’s CAA holding: the Court may be understood to read the 
statute in light of the global and domestic near-consensus that some legal action to 
redress climate change is necessary.  See infra Part VI.C. 
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avoiding endangerment with the question, lay the groundwork 
for future climate change litigation challenging under-protective 
regulatory decisions. 
In this respect, the impact of Massachusetts on other climate 
change cases has already begun.  Perhaps most notably, in 
Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic & 
Safety Administration (NHTSA), the Ninth Circuit relied heavily 
upon the scientific evidence of climate change in requiring 
NHTSA to reconsider its fuel efficiency standards for light 
trucks.227  The court noted, among other things, that the 
relevance of certain cases relied upon by the agency was “limited 
by the fact that they were decided two decades ago, when 
scientific knowledge of climate change and its causes were not as 
advanced as they are today.”228  On the basis of this scientific 
consensus concerning climate change, the Court reasoned that 
“[t]he need of the nation to conserve energy is even more 
pressing today” than when fuel efficiency standards were first 
required.229  Like Massachusetts, the NHTSA opinion discusses 
reports of the IPCC and the Natural Resources Council in detail 
to support its analysis.230 
In the Endangered Species Act context, the district court in 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Kempthorne held that the 
Fish and Wildlife Service erred by failing to consider the impact 
of climate change in a biological opinion concluding that water 
diversion planned for the California Bay Delta would not 
jeopardize a listed species, the Delta smelt.231  Essentially, the 
plaintiffs argued that the biological opinion was flawed because 
it assumed hydrology to be constant over the next twenty years 
despite strong scientific evidence suggesting that climate change 
will affect the hydrology through reduced winter snowpack.232  
Not unlike the EPA in Massachusetts, the Fish and Wildlife 
 
227 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic & Safety Admin., 508 
F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 2007). 
228 Id. at 530 (citing Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1447–49).  The court cited 
Massachusetts for its discussion of scientific progress in understanding climate 
change and that the harms resulting from it are “well recognized.”  Id. at 530 n.41. 
229 Id. at 530. 
230 See id. 
231 Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 387–88 (E.D. 
Cal. 2007). 
232 Id. at 369. 
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Service argued that it “responsibly refused to engage in sheer 
guesswork, and properly declined to speculate as to how global 
warming might affect delta smelt.”233 
Unlike NHTSA, the Kempthorne court did not cite 
Massachusetts nor elaborate on the strength of scientific 
consensus on climate change.  It did, however, conclude that, 
“[a]t the very least, these studies [in the record] suggest that 
climate change will be an important aspect of the problem 
meriting analysis in the [biological opinion].”234  On this basis, 
after rejecting an argument that other factors in the biological 
opinion were sufficient proxies for climate change, the court 
granted the plaintiffs’ summary judgment on the ground that the 
biological opinion failed to consider the effects of climate 
change.235 
The court’s endorsement of climate change science in 
Massachusetts may also prove significant in other areas in which 
scientific consensus urges more robust legal responses.  A prime 
example is global biodiversity loss. 
Like climate change, biodiversity loss is a global 
environmental issue with long-term and wide-ranging potential 
impacts.  Also like climate change, scientific consensus on the 
reality and significance of biodiversity loss is unequivocal.236 
The current rate of species loss–100 to 1000 times greater 
than in pre-human times–probably qualifies as one of five or six 
mass extinction events over a 570-million-year period.237  Aside 
from ethical and aesthetic issues, the current rate of biodiversity 
loss threatens ecosystem function and ability to achieve 
sustainable development goals such as poverty elimination.238 
 
233 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
234 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
235 Id. at 370. 
236 See, e.g., D.U. Hooper et al., Effects of Biodiversity on Ecosystem 
Functioning: A Consensus of Current Knowledge, 75 ECOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS 
3 (2005). 
237 E.g., Jim Chen, Legal Mythmaking in a Time of Mass Extinctions: Reconciling 
Stories of Origins with Human Destiny, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 279, 284–91 
(2005). 
238 For example, the parties to the Convention on Biodiversity subsequently 
agreed “to achieve by 2010 a significant reduction of the current rate of biodiversity 
loss at the global, regional and national level as a contribution to poverty alleviation 
and to the benefit of all life on earth.”  U.N. Env’t Programme, Conference of the 
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Strategic Plan for the  
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Legal consensus on the significance of biodiversity has also 
progressed.239  The international community negotiated the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)240 to open it for 
signature at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit (at the same time as the 
UNFCCC), and 168 states have signed the Convention.241  The 
United States signed, but did not ratify, the CBD, and did not 
participate in the 2000 Cartagena Protocol to the CBD.242  
Currently, many nations are calling for a multilateral 
biodiversity science panel, modeled on the IPCC, to raise 
awareness of, and solidify consensus on, biodiversity science.243 
Despite the United States’ disengagement in recent 
international biodiversity preservation efforts, the primary 
domestic biodiversity law–the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA)–remains one of the strongest national laws for 
biodiversity preservation.244  Thus, effectuating the scientific 
consensus on biodiversity presents a different issue for courts 
than the question of compelling agencies to address climate 
change issues in the first instance.  Nonetheless, opportunities to 
consider extra-territorial implications of U.S. biodiversity laws 
(such as Defenders and Japan Whaling) have arisen and will 
undoubtedly arise again.  Further, the Massachusetts Court’s 
recognition of climate change consensus illuminates the 
importance for domestic agencies to incorporate climate change 
 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Annex I(11), U.N. Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20 (2002), available at http://www.cbd.int/decisions/default 
.aspx?m=COP-06&id=7200. 
239 One of the earliest multilateral environmental agreements–the Convention 
on the Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 
U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243–seeks to redress biodiversity loss, but has generally 
been ineffective (at best). 
240 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Convention on 
Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992). 
241 List of Parties, http://www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list.shtml (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2008). 
242 See id. 
243 See Consultative Process Towards an IMoSEB: International Mechanism on 
Scientific Expertise on Biodiversity, http://www.imoseb.net/ (last visited Feb. 17, 
2008).  See also, Lawrence J. Speer, Nations Call for International Body to Study 
Threats to Earth’s Biodiversity, 30 BNA Int’l Env’t Rep. (BNA) 963 (2007). 
244 See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Comment, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal 
Protection of Biological Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 265 (1991) (the ESA is 
“widely regarded as the strongest legislation ever devised for the protection of 
nonhuman species”). 
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issues into their regulatory programs, including the need to 
harmonize biodiversity preservation and climate change policy.245 
C.  Bringing It All Back Home: Global Environmental 
Concerns Enter U.S. Courts 
Massachusetts246 is the first time that a majority of the Court 
explicitly recognized the connection between federal 
environmental regulation and global environmental issues.  
Indeed, it may be the Court’s first significant recognition of the 
global nature of some environmental concerns. 
The Court’s conclusion that standing existed in Masschusetts, 
particularly application of the Defenders framework, is 
important not only for its relevance to common domestic 
environmental litigation.  Recognition that an issue of clearly 
global scope is justiciable may prove very important to the 
continued engagement of U.S. courts to the most pressing 
environmental issues because, although domestic concerns 
remain fundamentally important, “in recent decades a series of 
inescapably international problems have emerged, including 
climate change, thinning of the Earth’s protective ozone layer, 
loss of biodiversity, and depletion of fisheries in the world’s 
oceans.” 247  In determining whether domestic courts will provide 
a forum for engaging these issues, standing is a threshold 
question.248  In part, this question turns on normative 
assessments of what constitutes justiciable harm.249  
Massachusetts’ standing analysis is a major judicial milestone 
that reflects broader changes in social understanding of the 
human relationship to environmental systems–“our ever-
increasing global interconnectedness [that] spreads the effects of 
 
245 See generally J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: 
Building Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
246 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1463 (2007). 
247 Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing 
Administrative Law, 115 YALE L. J. 1490, 1554 (2006). 
248 Cf. Lakshman D. Guruswamy & Brent R. Hendricks, INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 650 (2d ed. 2003). 
249 See Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 
WIS. L. REV. 897, 984 (“[H]arm is a normative concept dependent on social 
judgments about the interests that matter, bound up in social visions of the good 
and the bad.”). 
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human action–both good and bad–more broadly than ever 
before.”250 
The Massachusetts majority’s analysis of standing establishes 
that the global nature of a problem does not, on its own, defeat 
standing.  Further, the opinion suggests an unprecedented 
recognition of domestic environmental agencies as actors on 
global systems.  The agencies’ authority over global problems is 
obviously not complete.  The Court’s recognition that agency 
actions often impact global systems that, in turn, affect plaintiffs 
may provide the framework for standing in other globally 
significant environmental cases (provided statutory 
authorization exists). 
The measure of agency action on the merits suggested by 
Massachusetts is scientific.  The Court recited much of the 
consensus evidence for climate change and directed the EPA to 
reach a scientific conclusion under the statute.251  Massachusetts 
is apparently the first time that the Court draws on the widely 
recognized scientific consensus on a globally significant 
environmental problem to support its decision overturning 
domestic agency action.  This explicit connection is important 
because it supports (directly in the case of climate change, 
indirectly for other issues) the use of such consensus as a 
background principle to be applied in reviewing environmentally 
important domestic agency decisions. 
In this way, Massachusetts begins to suggest a new paradigm 
for thinking about federal regulation of globally significant 
environmental issues.  Massachusetts could be a jumping-off 
point for greater judicial consideration of domestic regulation of 
global problems and, perhaps, international regimes addressing 
those problems.  The contours of such a paradigm require 
further research beyond the scope of this Article, including an 
assessment of current international regimes, the existence of 
international environmental norms, and an appropriate 
framework, if any, for bringing them to bear on domestic 
regulatory agencies through domestic litigation.252 
 
250 Id. 
251 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1448–49, 1463 (2007). 
252 I will develop this theme further in a future article.  Materials from my 
presentation in February 2008 on this issue, (entitled, “International Consensus & 
U.S. Climate Change Litigation”) are on file with the author. 
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Massachusetts may be the first step in greater judicial 
awareness of the global interconnectedness (or “globalism”)253 of 
environmental systems.  This reality, long recognized by 
scientists, drives the tremendous growth of international 
environmental law.  It seems only a matter of time before 
globalism becomes commonplace in federal environmental 




Standing is the gateway to federal courts, particularly for 
environmental plaintiffs who depend upon the legal recognition 
of complex causal pathways to demonstrate harm.  Climate 
change, as a global phenomenon with a multitude of individual 
causes, epitomizes the difficulty of fitting environmental claims 
within a narrow conception of litigation appropriate for 
traditional common law tort or contract claims. 
In its standing analysis, Massachusetts demonstrates 
recognition of an environmentally attuned theory of justiciability 
that gives effect to the more public law function of 
environmental litigation and depends upon recognition of the 
scientific basis of understanding climate change.  Massachusetts 
also recognizes, for the first time in Supreme Court precedent, 
that U.S. environmental regulation interacts with broader, global 
environmental systems that impact domestic concerns. 
The case is significant on its own terms, but its potential 
impact on future environmental litigation may be deeper than 
apparent from the face of the opinion.  To the extent that the 
features of the case discussed here–ecological standing theory, 
acceptance of scientific consensus as a measure of agency action, 
and acknowledgement that decisions affecting global systems 
create cognizable claims for U.S. courts–portend the future 
direction of environmental litigation, Massachusetts will 
inaugurate a much more globalist era of judicial review of 
environmental agency decisions. 
 
 
253 For an analysis of the term, globalism, see Joseph Nye, Globalism Versus 
Globalization, THE GLOBALIST, Apr. 15, 2002, http://www.theglobalist.com/ 
StoryId.aspx?StoryId=2392. 
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